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TAXING THE OUT-OF-STATE CORPORATION
A CONGRESSIONAL AWAKENING
by Stanley R. Huller
Without the benefit of congressional guidelines for nearly 170 years, the
courts were compelled to weigh increasing state efforts to tax interstate
commerce against the commands of the United States Constitution. A con-
flicting and confusing myriad of judicial decisions resulted, leaving both
the multistate taxpayer and the taxing state without any cognizable tax
standards.' In 1959 Congress for the first time exercised its powers to re-
strict state taxation of interstate business by enacting Public Law 86-272.'
Presently, the problems incident to interstate taxation again beckon Con-
gress. The purpose of this Comment is to reappraise these problems, sur-
vey the present status of the various state taxes, and evaluate the merits
of a comprehensive interstate tax bill currently awaiting final congression-
al action.'
I. CONGRESS' ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY YEARS OF SILENCE
During the 170 years of congressional inaction prior to Public Law 86-
272, the courts assumed the responsibility of establishing guidelines for
state taxation of the interstate seller. Despite a laudable effort by the courts,
however, a bewildering potpourri of legal decisions evolved from which no
workable rules for interstate taxation could be extracted.' The root of this
judicial maze stretched back at least as far as the Articles of Confederation
which, unlike the Constitution, contained no mutual tax concessions. Each
state was therefore encouraged to exercise its power over commerce inde-
pendently.' The result was an interstate tax scheme based upon burden-
' See Dowling, Introduction--State Taxation of Multistate Business, 18 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1957).
273 Star. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. S 381 (1964). The essential provisions of the Act are
as follows:
101. Imposition of Net Income Tax-Minimum Standards
(a) No state, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose, for any
taxable year . . . a net income tax on income derived within such state by any
person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such state
by or on behalf of such person . . . are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicition of orders by such person, or his representative, in such state
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the state for
approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a
point outside the state; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such state in
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders
by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from
such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
201. The Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Com-
mittee on Finance of the United States Senate, acting separately or jointly, or both,
or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, shall make full and complete studies
of all matters pertaining to the taxation of Interstate Commerce by the States ...
202. The Committees shall report to their respective Houses the results of such
studies, together with their proposals for legislation, on or before June 30, 1965.
3H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The bill is presently awaiting senatorial action. The
essential provisions of the bill as it now stands are attached hereto as an Appendix.
4 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 485 (1959) (Whittaker,
J., dissenting).
a Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention, cited in HuNT & SCOTT, DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1920).
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some individual state taxes which often engendered mutual distrust and
"angry regulations" among the states.'
With the adoption of the Constitution, the states surrendered portions
of their respective sovereignty, including many powers over commerce. Al-
though much confusion arose regarding the extent of the powers sur-
rendered by the states,7 the Constitution clearly prohibited the states from
individually levying duties on imports and exports' and vested in Congress
the power to regulate interstate commerce. From these constitutional con-
cepts the Supreme Court fostered the principle that the commerce clause
operated of its own volition to maintain freedom of trade among the
states." Freedom of trade could not be maintained unless the states were
prohibited from individually exercising their taxing powers beyond their
respective borders.11
The Development of the Net Income Tax. Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing District"s was the first major decision affecting the development of
interstate commerce. The case involved a license tax on transient salesmen
whose only contact with the taxing state was the solicitation of business for
out-of-state merchants. The Court held that "interstate commerce [could
not] be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid
on [intrastate] commerce."'" Thus the Court completed the full circle,
beginning with the Articles of Confederation and the proposition that each
state was at liberty to tax its neighbor and ending with Robbins, holding
that states were completely without the power to levy any tax on inter-
state commerce.4
Despite the temporary setback in Robbins, the states continued to probe
the possibilities of interstate taxation. In 1891 the Supreme Court upheld a
tax imposed by the state of Maine on an out-of-state corporation." The
case, however, was readily distinguishable from Robbins because the tax-
payer owned substantial properties in Maine and the tax was not a condi-
tion to commencement of interstate business, but was for the privilege of
exercising the corporate franchise in the taxing state. Other cases have fol-
lowed the distinction and sustained the tax where the incident thereof fell
upon local instead of interstate business."
8 Id.
"But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising,
and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 421 (1819).
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
OId. § 8.
1°In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415,
436 (1819).
"See, e.g., Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaners, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 395 (1952); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
'2 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
'
5 Id. at 497.
"Robbins was based on the commerce clause, the Court reasoning that the clause vested in
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, and that since the states delegated this power
to Congress by adopting the Constitution, they no longer retained it themselves.
"5Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217 (1891).
"Ficklen v. Shelby County, 145 U.S. 1 (1892); Besser Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 74 N.M.
377, 394 P.2d 141 (1964).
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The rationale underlying the early judicial decisions permitting inter-
state taxation was predicated upon the notion that an out-of-state mer-
chant who exploits the local market should assume part of the state tax
burden. In addition, the failure to tax the foreign vendor often discrim-
inated against local merchants whose prices were higher because they were
subject to domestic taxes." The first significant breakthrough in interstate
taxation came in the area of sales and use taxes." Since the states ordinarily
did not impose taxes upon goods sent out of state by the seller" and since
the vendor could escape the imposition of a sales or use tax in the purchas-
ing state under early case law, the disadvantage to the local merchant was
most blatant in this area.' 0 In 1937 the Supreme Court finally acknowl-
edged this imbalance and removed the barrier to sales and use taxes, up-
holding the power of the state to impose a use tax upon an out-of-state
seller whose business was chiefly interstate."'
Bridging the resulting gap between the imposition of interstate sales
and use taxes and the imposition of income taxes on the out-of-state vendor
was more difficult because the income tax presented a much more complex
problem. For example, the vendor's state normally taxed the income of
the vendor, thereby presenting the possibility of multiple taxation." Fur-
thermore, income tax schemes were hopelessly confused, being based upon
a variety of standards having varying tax bases with intricate and incon-
sistent apportionment formulas." The heart of the problem was examined
in Freeman v. Hewit, a case challenging the application of the Indiana
gross income tax. The majority concluded that the tax was invalid because
it was levied directly upon the proceeds of interstate commerce. Although
voiding the tax, the case was significant in that it pointed the way toward
a feasible method of interstate taxation based upon net income.'
In the landmark decision of Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor'8
the Supreme Court again pointed toward the net income tax, reiterating
that a direct tax on interstate commerce could not stand even though a tax
of equal magnitude levied on a "local incident" could be sustained. In
Spector, a foreign trucking company maintained two stations in the taxing
"National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, 276 N.Y. 208, 11 N.E.2d 881 (1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 656 (1938).
18See Lockhart, The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce, 52 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1938).
"TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 (Supp. 1967). "There is hereby imposed a limited sales
tax at the rate of two per cent (2%) on the receipts from the sale at retail of all tangible personal
property within the state."
2 National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, 276 N.Y. 208, 11 N.E.2d 881 (1937), cert. denied,
303 U.S. 656 (1938).
II For a summary of these judicial decisions, see Hartman, Sales Taxation in Interstate Com-
merce, 9 VAND. L. REv. 138 (1956).
"See CCH STATE TAX GUIDE 5 10-000 (1968), for a summary of state acts. See also CON-
TROLLERS OF AMERICA, A DECADE OF PROGRESS REGARDING MULTIPLE TAXATION ON INCOME FROM
INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1960), for a summary of the multiple tax effects.
23 Id.
24329 U.S, 249 (1946).
"These illustrative instances show that a seller state has various means of obtaining legitimate
contributions to the costs of its government, without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales.
While these permitted taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are
not, as would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial
flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward 'of the commerce clause."
Id. at 256.
2'340 U.S. 602 (1951).
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state. The shipments were interstate and the proposed tax was levied on the
franchise of the corporation for the privilege of doing business in that state.
The tax was struck down because it was a direct "privilege" tax levied ex-
clusively on interstate business."7
It was not until 1959, just prior to Public Law 86-272, that the states
discovered the indirect method of interstate taxation required by Freeman
and Spector. In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
and its companion case, Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc.,2
8
the Supreme Court finally upheld a state tax based upon the income of a
foreign vendor. Northwestern involved a Minnesota tax specifically de-
signed to reach corporations engaged exclusively in interstate commerce.
The taxpayer maintained a permanent business establishment in Minnesota
and solicited orders therein, but all orders were sent out of state for ap-
proval. In Williams, the taxpayer was a Delaware corporation which also
maintained a sales office in the taxing state. Again all orders were sent to
the corporation's home state for approval. Thus, in both cases the tax-
payer's business in the taxing state was devoted solely to interstate com-
merce. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the tax in each instance,
stating:
We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign
corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not dis-
criminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing
state forming sufficient nexus to support the same."
The tax was sustained as an indirect levy upon net income derived from
the taxing state; it was not a gross receipts or "privilege" tax. The Court
again declared that a tax levied upon the privilege of doing interstate busi-
ness, although measured by net income, could not be sustained.'
II. AN ATTEMPTED TAX SOLUTION: PUBLIC LAW 86-272
Northwestern-Stockham apparently left the states free to levy taxes
upon the net income of a foreign vendor so long as the levy did not dis-
criminate in favor of intrastate business and was properly confined to sell-
ers whose activities within the state were substantial enough to satisfy due
process demands. However, there remained significant problems of recon-
ciling dissimilar state taxing statutes containing a multitude of tax rates
and requirements, and determining a clear-cut standard for delineating the
minimum contact necessary to sustain the imposition of the tax. These
problems were directly responsible for the passage of Public Law 86-272.
The 1959 Act. Following Northwestern-Stockham, a Louisiana tax statute
imposing a net income tax on an out-of-state seller whose sole contact with
that state consisted of soliciting orders through non-resident salesmen was
21d. at 608.





upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court." The United States Supreme
Court subsequently denied certiorari," apparently leaving the door open
for state taxation based upon mere solicitation." However, the United
States Senate responded to the challenge and held a series of public hear-
ings concerning the tax problem."' Shortly thereafter, Public Law 86-272
was enacted, prohibiting the levy of a net income tax upon any foreign
corporation which limited its activities in the taxing state to soliciting
orders for the purchase of tangible personal property." Thus, for purposes
of a net income tax, the minimum contact standard was drawn at the level
of the in-state sales office.
In addition to the basic tax exemption provided by Public Law 86-272,
there are several variations which appear to fall within the protective um-
brella. First, the fact that a foreign vendor maintains resident (as opposed
to non-resident) salesmen in the taxing state apparently does not place the
vendor outside the protection of the Act. "7 Secondly, a vendor cannot be
taxed solely on the basis of solicitation or other activities of an indepen-
dent contractor. " Thirdly, a foreign vendor is not subject to a net income
tax if the independent contractor accepts the solicited orders even though
accepting orders by employees of a foreign vendor in the taxing state is ap-
parently beyond the protection of the Act."
Limitations of Public Law 86-272. Public Law 86-272 provides a limited
guideline for taxing the income of interstate vendors, but the Act is replete
with problems. Certain activities of the foreign vendor are exempted from
taxation, but there is no relief from the complexity and multiplicity pro-
vided for those vendors who fall outside the protection of the Act. These
unfortunate enterprises must continue to evaluate the myriad of complex
state apportionment formulas.
'"Brown-Formen Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70
(1958), appeal dismissed, cert denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). To further add to the confusion, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in another Louisiana case having a similar fact situation, thus
leaving the impression that solicitation of orders alone might create a sufficient nexus to sustain the
tax. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984
(1959).
32359 U.S. 28 (1959).
"There was a significant reaction from the business community, illustrated by the following
statement: "The reaction to the decision was one of dismay in the business community and one of
confusion in the area of state government." 114 CONG. REc. 4148 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
34 Hearings, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, Senate Select Committee on Small Business,
86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
"For the essential provisions of Public Law 86-272, see note 2 supra.
s" Any uniform formula capable of completely eradicating the problem of varying state statutes
was left for another day, but the Act indirectly relieved the problem by establishing a higher
nexus level. In addition, Public Law 86-272 may have encouraged states to enact use taxes which
were not protected by the Act, with the result that the complexity of state tax schemes are
indirectly relieved, because a use tax is based upon the purchase price of goods, not upon a complex
apportionment formula.
3'See the statement by Senator Carlson (R. Kan.) in 105 CONG. REC. 16353 (1959): "Doe
lives in Atlanta and under the laws of Georgia, is domiciled in, or a resident of, Georgia. This
fact does not disqualify the company from exemptions from the Georgia net income tax provided
the only business activities within Georgia by or on behalf of the company are those specified in
section 101(a)."





Another shortcoming of the Act is the scope of its protection. An inter-
state business consisting of solicitation of orders for intangibles is not pro-
tected under the Act, because the provisions of the Act are applicable only
to sales of tangible personal property.' The Act also leaves open the ques-
tion of what activities beyond mere solicitation will create a sufficient con-
tact to sustain the tax. Does the fact that a salesman carries samples, accepts
a down payment, or uses a display room in the taxing state come within
the definition of "solicitation" and thus within the scope of the Act? Do
these activities, separately or in conjunction, constitute a distinct business
activity sufficient to justify a tax?
The most striking limitation of Public Law 86-272 is its potential dis-
crimination against the small interstate vendor. A large multistate opera-
tion, which can absorb the cost of compliance with state laws and still re-
alize substantial revenue gains, may readily limit its business activities so as
to come within the Act; but the small interstate seller, for whom compli-
ance is relatively expensive, may find that limiting business activities to the
prescribed statutory minimum is not economically feasible.41 Finally, Public
Law 86-272 provides only a limited regulation of interstate taxation be-
cause its provisions are applicable only to the imposition of net income
taxes. As a result, the states have employed a host of other taxes, such as
capital stock, franchise, sales and use, and gross receipts, in a continuing
effort to tax interstate business.'
III. ADDITIONAL STATE TAX BURDENS
Taxes Based upon Gross Receipts. Although gross receipts have been em-
ployed as a basis for interstate taxation,4 3 such taxes are less desirable than
a net income tax because they are inherently discriminatory." A gross re-
ceipts tax is unrelated to the profits of the seller and therefore discriminates
against those sellers having the lowest profit margins. Moreover, the gross
receipts levy presents a greater possibility of multiple taxation.' Such taxes
are typically unapportioned and can be levied at a given rate by each state
and subdivision thereof despite the fact that the same transaction has been
40 Id.
" The cost of compliance for a small interstate vendor is prohibitive. "Some idea of the tax
complexities confronting the interstate businessmen can be gained from the simple fact that a set
of state tax laws along with the regulations and supplementary material as published by a major
tax service is some 80 volumes thick and 22 feet in height. Add on the potential problems in
dealing with literally thousands of local jurisdictions and it is small wonder that the present
situation has been described as calling upon the taxpayer to comply with the uncompliable and
the tax administrator to enforce the unenforceable." 114 CONG. REc. 4150 (daily ed. May 22,
1968).
4 See Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA.
L. REV. 1051 (1960).
"See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ch. 72, art. 15 (1953). See also California Co. v. Colorado, 141 Colo.
288, 300, 348 P.2d 382, 388 (1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 285 (1960), where the court
stated that a gross receipts tax was but a variety of the income tax.
44 H. GRovEs, FINANCING GOVERNMENT 331 (5th ed. 1958). It is significant to note that
gross receipts taxes are more appealing than net income taxes in at least one respect-they may be
reliable revenue producers even in bad times when corporations have no net income.
'"The multiplicity of state taxes measured by gross receipts from interstate transactions would
spell the destruction of interstate commerce and renew the barriers to interstate trade which it was
the object of the Commerce Clause to remove." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303
U.S. 250, 256 (1938), See also note 5 supra.
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taxed in other jurisdictions."
Because of these discriminatory effects, the Supreme Court has con-
sistently distinguished net income and gross receipts taxes. 7 Thus, in one
case the Court declared that a gross receipts tax constituted a direct burden
on interstate commerce and could not be sustained." After applying this
mechanical "direct burden" test for nearly fifty years, the Supreme Court
adopted a new approach and upheld a New Mexico gross receipts tax be-
cause the particular tax did not result in multiple taxation.49 In subsequent
decisions the Court attempted to avoid "multiple taxation" by selecting a
particular element of a business transaction which could be designated as an
"intrastate incident" upon which the tax was levied.'e An allocation sys-
tem was thereby achieved with only the state in which the "intrastate inci-
dent" occurred having the power to tax gross receipts. But the "intrastate
incident" was not always easily discernible; thus many courts discarded the
approach and returned to the "direct burden" test."
Because of this judicial vacillation, the current status of gross receipts
taxation is not entirely clear. Many courts continue to permit the gross re-
ceipts levy where some justifiable attempt at apportionment is indicated."2
But a comprehensive system of apportioned gross receipts taxes is unlikely
because it is improbable that an adequate apportionment formula can be de-
fined to tax equitably the gross receipts of all types of businesses." More-
over, a tax system based upon apportioned gross receipts is less likely to
appeal to state interests because the interstate concern would pay only an
apportioned tax while domestic businesses would pay the full tax. 4
Franchise Taxes. In addition to the taxes levied directly upon the income of
out-of-state sellers, most states attempt to exact an additional tax for the
privilege of conducting business in that state. The "privilege tax" is usual-
ly measured by the net income of the vendor, but it differs from the net
income tax in that its tax "subject" is the doing of business. On the other
hand, the net income of the seller is both the measure and the subject of
the net income tax. At first blush, the distinction between the two taxes
4 See W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 9-2 (1963).
"'See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938); Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
41 Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
" Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
s
9 See, e.g., Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); McGoldrick v.
Bernwind-White Coal Mining Co., 322 U.S. 340 (1944). But see Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S.
416, 423 (1946) where the Court stated: "All interstate commerce takes place within the con-
fines of the States and necessarily involves 'incidents' occurring within each State through which
it passes . . . and there is no known limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what
is an entire or integral economic process particular phases or incidents, label them as 'separate and
distinct' or 'local' and thus achieve its desired result."
"' Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Manila Trading & Supply Co. (Guam) v. Maddox,
335 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1964).
" Green v. Western Union Tel. Co., 123 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1960). See also Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d
1322 (1959).
" See Comment, Federal Limitation on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 953, 1024 (1962).
14 W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 9-9 (1963).
5 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2904 (1955). For the privilege of doing business in Ten-




seems trival, but dicta in Nortbwestern-Stockham made it clear that pure
interstate commerce may be subjected to a direct net income tax; however,
a franchise tax, although measured by net income, is invalid if levied upon
pure interstate commerce."
Because of this distinction, a direct net income tax can be levied on any
out-of-state seller whose activities are not protected by Public Law 86-272,
but a franchise tax cannot be levied upon the same seller absent at least
some mixture of intrastate business. Thus a vendor who maintains a sales
office in a foreign state (devoted solely to interstate business) can be com-
pelled to pay a net income tax, but not a franchise tax. This distinction
between the tax subject and the tax measure has met with vigorous dis-
approval, 7 and it remains a confusing clog in the wheel of interstate taxa-
tion.
Property Taxes. The typical property tax is an ad valorem tax, based upon
the value of the taxpayer's property, computed by assigning a specified
rate to the total value of the property." Such a tax presents no problem to
the single state taxpayer since both the property and the business activity
are confined to the same state. But where the giant multistate taxpayer
owns realty or personalty in several taxing jurisdictions, the problem be-
comes more complex. This complexity arises because the commerce clause
apparently does not prohibit state taxation of tangible or intangible prop-
erty located in the taxing state even though the property is owned by an
interstate concern and used in interstate commerce."
Taxes levied upon tangible realty or personalty are less likely to create
concern because double taxation is improbable. For realty, the situs of the
property marks the taxing incident and any jurisdiction other than the
situs is prohibited from levying a property tax on the realty."° For tangible
personalty the situs is again the controlling factor. 1 Thus, double taxation
could occur only in the few instances where the property is temporarily
absent from the situs.
In the case of intangible property, double taxation is a reality."2 Prop-
erty taxes upon intangible property are ordinarily based upon the value of
corporate franchises, securities, and promissory notes."3 Such taxes create
the problem of double taxation because they presently may be imposed
56"On the other hand, it has been established since 1918 that a net income tax on revenues
derived from interstate commerce does not offend constitutional limitations upon state interference
with such commerce." Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
"'Many have called for judicial abolition of the Spector rule, and were disheartened by its
reaffirmation in Nortbwestern-Stockham." W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 8-6
(1963). It has also been pointed out that some states have attempted to circumvent its impact by
seizing upon the distinction and making statutory amendments to gain maximum revenues. Note,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: The Current Status, 19 Sw. L.J. 170, 172 n.16 (1965).
This distinction might also account for the great taxing shift to sales and use taxes. Id. See also
note 36 supra.
58See W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 14-4 (1963).
50 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).6OHays v. Pacific Mail S.S. & Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
61Fink v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
"'See note 22 supra.6
sSee Comment, suPra note 53, at 979 (1962).
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in both the domicile state and the state where the taxpayer actually uses
the property. 4 This form of double taxation has been specifically upheld
by the United States Supreme Court on the basis that both states have
sufficient contact with the taxpayer to sustain a property tax. 5 It has been
suggested that a properly apportioned property tax on intangible property
would prevent double taxation," but presently the only satisfactory ap-
proach has been to apportion the tax on the income from such intangibles. 7
Sales and Use Taxes. To vitiate even the limited effect of Public Law 86-
272, most states have enacted a sales tax accompanied by a compensating
use tax, 8 thereby adding confusion to an already perplexing area. Both
taxes are generally added to the cost of the goods so that the purchaser
ultimately bears the tax burden. The sales tax is typically levied upon the
gross receipts of a sale made within the jurisdiction of the taxing state. De-
livery to the buyer within the state is usually a prerequisite to support the
tax."' As an additional limitation, the vendor must have sufficient "con-
tacts" with the taxing state to satisfy due process and commerce clause
notions."
The degree of contact required is not altogether clear, but the Supreme
Court has held that maintaining an office in the taxing state is sufficient.'
A continuous solicitation program employing salesmen in the taxing state
may also be considered sufficient contact to support a sales tax.7 In McLeod
v. 1. E. Dilworth Co.," however, the Supreme Court invalidated an Arkan-
sas sales tax which was levied upon an out-of-state seller whose sole con-
tact with Arkansas arose through the solicitation of orders in that state by
the seller's traveling salesmen. The contract of sale was made outside Ar-
kansas and the goods were delivered to the purchaser by common carrier.
Whether or not the tax could have been sustained if the contract had been
made in Arkansas or if the goods had been delivered by the seller was not
answered by the Court. Cases subsequent to McLeod failed to clarify the
minimum contact standard.
To combat the inadequacies of a naked sales tax, the states developed a
compensating use tax which is levied upon the use of the property within
the taxing state.' The combined sales-use tax scheme results in a sales tax
on the out-of-state vendor measured by the price of his goods coupled with
a use tax upon the in-state purchaser (though collected by the seller) in the
same amount as the sales tax.' If the sales tax has been levied upon a pure
"'Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
6' State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
6'W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 14-8 (1963).
67 See Saxe & Keigwin, Taxation of Intangibles in Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REV. 1212
(1960).
SSee, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 324-400 (1957).
69This requirement may be demanded by the Constitution. McGoldrick v. Bernwind-White
Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 58 (1940).
"0 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
"' McGoldrick v. Bernwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).71See W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER STATES 13-7 (1963).
'322 U.S. 327 (1944).
74 See, e.g., TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.02 (Supp. 1967).
' Id. The prescribed rate for Texas is two per cent. See note 19 supra.
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interstate transaction and is thus offensive to constitutional principles, the
use tax is required. If both taxes are applicable, statutes typically authorize
the imposition of the sales tax to the exclusion of the use tax."6 In short, the
seller pays a sales tax, if not forbidden by the commerce clause; however,
if the sales tax is prohibited, the seller collects a use tax and remits it to the
taxing state.
The minimum contacts that an out-of-state seller must have with a tax-
ing state to require the collection of a use tax seemingly should be the same
as those contacts governing sales taxes. The courts, however, have required
less contact in the case of a use tax, apparently reasoning that it is less of a
burden to require an out-of-state vendor to act as a tax collector for the
state than to bear a direct sales tax levy." Accordingly, a use tax has been
upheld where the seller merely owns property in the state,"8 conducts an
out-of-state mail order business through a local retail outlet," employs non-
resident salesmen to conduct a program of continuous solicitation in a tax-
ing state," and solicits orders in the taxing state for a variety of firms."1 The
Court only recently has defined the outer limit of the use tax by prohib-
iting the imposition of a use tax upon a mail order taxpayer who had no
property or salesmen in the taxing state. "2 Because of the lenient attitude of
the courts toward sales and use tax systems, such taxing schemes have be-
come an increasingly important source of revenue for the states."3
At present, the confusing system of interstate taxation may be sum-
marized as follows: A tax measured by unapportioned gross receipts or
levied on the privilege of doing business may not be imposed by any state
upon a taxpayer who does not conduct both interstate and intrastate busi-
nesses even though a sales office is maintained in the taxing state;" a tax
which is apportioned and based upon the net income of the taxpayer may
be imposed by any state in which the taxpayer maintains a sales office; " a
tax levied upon the consumer and collected by the taxpayer can be imposed
by any state in which the taxpayer solicits business through agents or em-
ployees;" a tax based upon the property of the taxpayer can be imposed
only at the situs of the property if tangible," or at both the domicile and
the location of business activity if intangible."
"8 TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 20.04(J) (Supp. 1967).
77McCleod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). In Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v.
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939), the Supreme Court upheld a use tax on the basis that requiring
a seller to collect another's tax, as opposed to a direct tax imposition, is not taxation of interstate
commerce. But see McGoldrick v. Bernwind-Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940), calling for
the same nexus requirement for sales and use taxes.
78Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
"
8 Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); General Trading Co. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
85 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). The Court upheld a use tax on a Georgia
seller who was required to collect a Florida use tax on the basis of solicitation in Florida by
independent brokers.
82 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
85 See Note, supra note 57, at 174.
84 Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
" Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); 73 Stat. 555
(1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1964).
8 Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).87 Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. & Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
88Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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Because of the bewildering status of interstate taxation created by the
great variety of interstate tax devices, it is not surprising that Congress was
pressured into action."9 Yet Public Law 86-272 was merely a beginning, in-
tended as an interim measure to preserve the status quo pending compli-
ance with a mandate that the judiciary committee "make a full and com-
plete study of all matters pertaining to taxation of interstate commerce by
the states.""
The committee report concluded that Congress must go beyond Public
Law 86-272 and enact a comprehensive tax bill because present state tax
laws are perplexing, difficult to meet, and beyond judicial control."' As a
result of this study, the Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Inter-
state Commerce has promulgated a comprehensive tax bill in an effort to
reconcile the competing interests of state revenue departments with the
free flow of commerce.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2158
Title I. The first title of H.R. 2158" provides that no interstate vendor
who has less than $1,000,000 in annual net federal income shall be sub-
ject to an income, gross receipts, or capital stock tax in any state in which
the vendor does not maintain a "business location." A business location is
defined as: (1) the owning or leasing of real estate in the taxing state, (2)
the maintenance of a stock of goods for sale in the regular course of busi-
ness, or (3) the presence of a local employee in the state whose activities
consist of more than the mere solicitation of orders in the taxing state.
Title II. Under the provisions of title II, any small business subject to a tax
in a foreign state under title I may elect to use an optional two-factor
(payroll and property) formula to determine its tax liability.4 Under this
formula, no state will be permitted to tax a greater percentage of income
or capital than the percentage arrived at by computing the proportion of
tangible assets in the state and the wages of employees within that state to
the taxpayer's total assets and wages.
O""The Court's suggestion to Congress (Northwestern-Stockham) that it legislate in the field,
together with the alarm with which the business community quite understandably received the
1959 decisions, was sufficient to mobilize the 86th Congress, then in session, and Public Law 86-272
was promptly written into the statute book." 114 CONG. REC. 4143 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
See also note 33 supra.
9 See note 2 supra.
91 Note, supra note 57, at 175.9
2H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See the Appendix for the pertinent provisions of
the bill.
' See Appendix, tit. I, § 101 (1). A corporation is excluded under title V if it has more than
$1,000,000 net federal income.
" The typical state tax apportionment formula is applied as follows: Total Tax Liability
(Rate of Tax) (Apportioned Net Income). Apportioned net income is equal to the product of
the corporation's total net income and an apportionment ratio. The apportionment provides the
point of deviation between the typical three-factor state formula and the two-factor formula
featured in H.R. 2158. The three-factor formula consists of a fraction, the numerator of which
is based upon the in-state property, in-state payroll, and in-state sales, and a denominator consisting
of the seller's total property, payroll, and sales. The two-factor formula is applied identically
except that the sales element is eliminated from both the numerator and the denominator. The
desired result of either formula is to allocate to each state its fair share of tax revenues without
compelling any corporation to pay more than its fair share of taxes.
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Title III. Title III is designed to increase compliance with, and enforcement
of, sales and use taxes. s In addition, this section reduces the possibility of
multiple state taxation and establishes uniform guideposts for the collec-
tion of use taxes. Reduction in interstate sales taxation is accomplished by
prohibiting the levy of a sales tax unless the taxing state is the destination
of the interstate shipment. Unlike present tax laws, collection of a use tax
may be required of the interstate seller only when he maintains a business
location in the taxing state. A business location again includes owning or
leasing property, maintaining a stock of goods, or employing agents to do
more than merely solicit orders in the taxing state. In addition, a state may
require the collection of a use tax from an out-of-state seller who regularly
makes household deliveries in the taxing state. Each of these four jurisdic-
tional standards is independent and only one need be met to sustain the tax.
Title III also provides for a reciprocal credit whereby each state must
give credit for a prior sales or use tax imposed by a sister state." This provi-
sion protects consumers who change their state of residence. Another pro-
vision of title III provides that if an interstate sale is made to a business
purchaser within a state in which the purchaser is registered for sales tax
purposes, the seller need not collect a tax. The purchaser would simply re-
mit the tax directly to the taxing state. The last section of title III curtails
present interstate taxation by local governments. This provision is designed
to protect small companies from having to comply with the nearly 3,000
political subdivisions currently taxing interstate taxpayers, each according
to its own standards."
Title IV. Title IV provides that no state or political subdivision thereof
shall impose a tax on the income of any individual who earned or derived
such income during any period while that person was not a resident of the
taxing state, except to the extent such income was earned or derived from
sources within the state. This provision is designed to bring interstate taxa-
tion of individuals in line with the other three titles of H.R. 2158 which
define the limits of business taxation.9
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT H.R. 2158
Since its inception, H.R. 2158 has generated enthusiastic criticism from
numerous influential groups.9 In fact, on the day before the bill was fin-
ally passed by the House of Representatives, a resolution of the 1968 West-
ern Governors' Conference was introduced in the House urging the defeat
of the proposed bill." The attitude of the Governors, as well as that of the
"' Non-compliance with present state tax laws has been found to be 97.5 per cent in the income
tax area and 93.5 per cent in the sales and use tax area and has been characterized as "a despicable
situation." 114 CONG. REc. 4137 (daily ed. May 23, 1968).
96 See Appendix, tit. III, § 301 (c). The reciprocal tax credit is presently employed in some
state statutes, See, e.g., TEX. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 7359a (Supp. 1967).
97 114 CONG. REc. 4139 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
98See Appendix, tit. VI, § 601.
" Objections have been voiced by the National Legislative Congress, the National Association of
Attorneys General, National Association of Tax Administrators, and the Council of State Govern-
ments. 114 CONG. REC. 4019 (daily ed. May 21, 1968).199 Id.
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other dissenters, stems from several recurrent criticisms. First, it has been
argued that the bill is "still another incursion by the Central Government
against the states hitting them at the very roots of the federal system. 1. 1
Since raising revenue is essential to the function of any government, it is
feared that if congressional limitation is imposed upon state taxing pow-
ers, "the states would indeed be nothing more than administrative subdivi-
sions of a unitary governmental system."1"2 While this argument elicits an
immediate sympathy for preserving "states rights" in a time when the fed-
eral government is seemingly everywhere, it simply ignores the fact that
present state policies and judicial decisions are inadequate to deal with the
problems of multistate taxation. It was precisely for this reason that the
Supreme Court in Northwestern-Stockham invited Congress to act.'
This argument also ignores the fact that H.R. 2158 represents signifi-
cant compromises, many of which have been incorporated solely to protect
the states' taxing powers."' For example, the bill originally called for a
federal administrator to supervise the disputes which might arise. After
continuous outcries of "states rights," the provision was deleted so that
presently there is no procedure for federal intervention. '
As a corollary to the first argument, critics of H.R. 2158 have suggested
that a more appropriate means of effecting interstate tax regulations can
be brought about by voluntary state adoption of a uniform tax compact."
This argument does merit at least theoretical appeal; in fact, sixteen states
have adopted a "uniform act.' 0.7 Nevertheless, the prospect of a self-
adopted uniform interstate tax system is simply not a reality.
0 8
Many of the most strident criticisms stem from the fear that H.R. 2158
will somehow rob the state treasuries of needed revenues.'09 However, this
criticism ignores nearly eight years of congressional investigation, which in-
dicates that H.R. 2158 will not result in more than two-tenths of one per
cent revenue gain or loss to any single state.10 Moreover, a loss of revenue
probably would not occur for the simple reason that the states are not now
collecting taxes from businesses which would receive protection from the
Act. The record indicates that there is presently 97.5 per cent noncompli-
ance in the sales and use tax area alone." In addition, any revenue loss that
might occur could be offset by the increased gain from new business gen-
'01 114 CONG. REC. 4143 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
102 Id.
10 "It has long been established doctrine that the Commerce Clause gives exclusive power to
the Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and its failure to act on the subject in the area of
state taxation nevertheless requires that interstate commerce shall be free from any direct re-
striction or imposition by the states." Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
'04 114 CONG. REC. 4137 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
10' "They hollered 'states rights' and said they did not want to have Federal intervention. So
what do we do in this bill? In this bill we concede that. There is no provision in this bill now
for Federal intervention. Everything is left up to the states as the matter now stands." Id.
'" 114 CONG. REC. 4019 (daily ed. May 21, 1968).
107 114 CONG. REC. 4144 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
' Id. at 4143. See also Dane, A Solution to the Problem of State Taxation of Interstate Com-
merce, 12 VILL. L. REV. 507, 512 (1967) for a discussion of the states' application of a uniform
tax act which is anything but uniform.
1' 114 CONG. REC. 4142 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
"OlId. at 4137.
111 Id. at 4136. See also note 95 supra.
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erated by the enactment of H.R. 2158, especially in view of the provisions
designed to reduce the possibility of multiple taxation.11
Other critics have argued that the bill discriminates against domestic
vendors.11 Supposedly, the bill would provide a tax haven for interstate
sellers by permitting these sellers to send any number of salesmen into a
foreign state without compelling them to contribute any revenue to the
state.1 4 However, such critics overlook the fact that if all states impose
some sort of corporate income tax, the interstate vendor will not escape
liability because it will still be subject to a full income tax in the home
state. " In effect, the Act will concentrate tax revenue in the states where
the vendor has a business location. Moreover, this argument carries less
weight in view of the fact that out-of-state sellers are not now complying
with state tax laws. 16
Still others have criticized H.R. 2158 because it contains an optional
two-factor formula for small businesses which are subject to the taxes of
a foreign state. " ' This provision goes beyond defining jurisdictional stand-
ards and has been described as "an unwarranted intrusion into the internal
tax policy of the states...11 . Although there is nothing inherently unfair
about a three-factor formula (property, payroll, and sales), there are sev-
eral justifications for the alternate two-factor formula based upon payroll
and property." Since the completion of a sale in a state alone is insufficient
to sustain tax jurisdiction," it is only logical that including a sales factor
in the apportionment scheme would "be undesirable since it would result in
allocating income to states which had no jurisdiction to tax.''. In addi-
tion, the fact that the sales factor has been eliminated from the H.R. 2158
formula relieves the small company of the necessity of keeping detailed
sales records of each interstate sale.111
Some critics also have been concerned with the fact that H.R. 2158 re-
stricts the ability of a state to require an interstate vendor to collect a use
tax.1 3 The bill does afford all out-of-state sellers more immunity from the
use tax than is furnished by current judicial decisions.1 " In addition, the
112 1d. at 4151.
"1 Dane, supra note 108, at 521.
"' "The bill would also place California business at a distinct disadvantage to their out-of-
state competitors, who could employ as many full-time salesmen as they wish to solicit orders in
California without incurring sales tax liability or being required to collect the California use tax."
114 CONG. REc. 4151 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
" Dane, supra note 108, at 514.
115 See note 95 supra.
11"'Title II is an unwarranted intrusion into the internal tax policy of the states. Further, it
will prove burdensome to those it intends to benefit, and it is poor public policy." 114 CONG.
REC. 4144 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
118 Id.
119 See note 94 supra for the fundamentals of apportionment using either a two- or three-factor
formula.
0 See Appendix, tit. 1, § 101.
11 Dane, supra note 108, at 515.
"' Such a procedure would also eliminate the sellers' having to file fifty separate state tax re-
turns.
la3 114 CONG. REc. 4151 (daily ed. May 22, 1968). See also note 114 supra.124 Under Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960), the Supreme Court has held that a
use tax may be required where the taxpayer merely solicits orders in the taxing state. See note 81
supra. Under H.R. 2158 the seller would not be subject to the use tax requirement unless it
maintained a "business location" in the taxing state. See Appendix, tit. I, § 101 (2).
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bill has vitiated the prevailing notion among the judiciary that a lower
nexus level is required to compel a foreign vendor to act as a tax collector
than is necessary to support the direct imposition of a tax upon that yen-
dor."' In fact, out-of-state sellers are given broader protection in the use
tax area because the exemption from the use tax applies to all interstate
sellers without a "business location" in the taxing state and without regard
for the amount of the taxpayer's net federal income."
The change of attitude in the use tax area arises from a realization that
the collection burden now being placed on the out-of-state seller is much
greater than was originally expected."' The use tax is intended to place the
ultimate burden upon the consumer. Nevertheless, the seller remains ac-
countable for all uncollected use taxes. In addition, the seller must, at its
peril, determine whether or not the use tax is applicable to each sale under
each state statute. Such a determination is especially difficult because each
business has its own peculiarities and each state statute has its own require-
ments."8 The result is that out-of-state sellers must either ignore state re-
quirements, thereby incurring the wrath of state officials, or they must
comply with such requirements and suffer the severe disadvantage of main-
taining comprehensive state tax departments.' Moreover, any incidental
advantage gained by exempting interstate sellers from the use tax when
they have no "business location" in the state may be partially offset by the
postage and handling fees concomitant to all out-of-state shipments.
Finally, states are presently prohibited by the Supreme Court decision in
Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland'3 from imposing a sales or use tax upon an
interstate seller whose sole contact with the taxing state is the delivery of
household goods therein. The decision has been vigorously criticized because
it permits border sellers to exploit neighboring markets without contribu-
ting any tax to state revenues.'3' H.R. 2158 eliminates this problem by
permitting states to tax any interstate seller who makes such regular deliv-
eries even though he has no "business location" in that state.'
VI. POSSIBLE SENATORIAL MODIFICATIONS
The complexity of designing a comprehensive interstate tax scheme suit-
ably balancing the interests of revenue seekers and business concerns sug-
gests that H.R. 2158 may yet undergo substantial revisions." The pro-
vision most likely to be changed is the optional two-factor formula which
has received the most severe criticism and which is most expendable.' One
suggested modification calls for a complete deletion of the option from the
bill." A more logical approach would be to require the use of the option in
12m See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
2See Appendix, tit I, § 101 (2).
12' Dane, supra note 108, at 524.
28Id. at 520.
129 See note 41 supra.
"20347 U.S. 340 (1954).
..' 114 CONG. REc. 4136 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
232 Id.
... At present the bill is under consideration in the Senate Finance Committee. See note 3
supra.
224 See note 117 supra, and accompanying text.
'as 114 CONG. REc. 4144 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
1968 ]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
all or none of the states. A more equitable tax would then be presented be-
cause a seller would be precluded from selecting only the state tax laws of-
fering the most lenient requirements." As a result, the individual state tax
systems would not be impugned, and those critics who complain of the bill's
unwarranted intrusion into the area of "states rights" would be appeased.
Another provision warranting possible modification is the arbitrary tax
immunity ceiling whereby those firms with less than $1,000,000 in annual
net federal income are exempt from net income, capital stock, and fran-
chise taxes. The immunity ceiling could be increased to include more out-
of-state sellers within the protection of the bill. This would be justified in
view of the relative ease with which today's businesses may expand in dol-
lar volume. A decrease in the ceiling appears unlikely because a lower figure
simply would not encompass enough interstate concerns. An alternative
would be to eliminate completely the net federal income requirement. Such
a change would be consistent with the sales and use tax provision which
presently has no immunity ceiling; however, elimination of the ceiling
would go beyond the admitted purpose of the act-to protect the small
interstate seller upon whom the current burden of interstate taxation falls
most heavily."' A more appropriate change would add the $1,000,000 ceil-
ing to the sales and use tax provisions, thereby achieving consistency and
insuring that the small vendor would continue to be the principal recipient
of the tax immunity.
Finally, the bill may be modified to provide special consideration for
certain industries which are not presently adequately covered by any pro-
vision of the bill. For example, the moving industry continues to face
double taxation because the bill does not restrict state ad valorem tax as-
sessments against these carriers."9 One instance of this injustice is illustrated
by the assessment of over $2,000 per year in ad valorem taxes by one neigh-
boring state against a common carrier even though the company neither
owned property nor maintained a station in the taxing state." ° The mover
was paying ad valorem taxes in his home state to the full extent and there-
fore was being subjected to double taxation.
The need for special tax relief in the moving industry is largely a result
of the nature of the business.14' In order to provide a moving service, mov-
ers are necessarily exposed to the multiplicity of state taxes because of the
need to cross state lines. 4' However, appropriate legislation need not permit
the movers to escape taxation. The Senate could prevent double taxation
and still require the industry to "pay its way" by simply requiring a "bus-
iness location" as a prerequisite to the imposition of ad valorem taxes by
a state.
'3' Dane, supra note 108, at 528.
137 Id.
"'"The exclusion from the provisions of the act for companies with an average annual in-
come of more than $1 million, recognizes that the burden of multiple tax obligations falls most
heavily upon small and medium-sized firms." 114 CONG. REC. 4149 (daily ed. May 22, 1968).
... See 114 CONG. Ric. 4148-50, for a discussion of this particular industry and the failure
of H.R. 2158 to provide adequate protection in this area.
1
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Taxation of the multistate concern inevitably involves reconciling the
competing and conflicting interests of state revenue departments and the
business community. The states are legitimately concerned with the prob-
lem of raising revenue to support their respective governments. On the
other hand, the business community is concerned with tax legislation which
reduces the high costs of doing business. H.R. 215 8 represents a valiant at-
tempt to weld these competing interests into a logical and just interstate
tax scheme. The bill is a result of nearly eight years of intensive congres-
sional study, and it goes far beyond its predecessor, Public Law 86-272, by
establishing positive jurisdictional standards for state taxation of out-of-
state sellers. These relatively simple guideposts will permit the courts to
make rational decisions without having to fathom new law in a tortuous
case by case method.
H.R. 2158 is not a perfect solution to the problems of interstate taxa-
tion. The two-factor apportionment formula is questionable; the incon-
sistency in having a $1,000,000 annual net federal income limitation for
capital stock, franchise, and net income taxes without a similar limitation
for sales and use taxes is perhaps even more dubious; the inequities due to
the lack of protection afforded certain special industries are only too ap-
parent. Despite these limitations, H.R. 2158 strikes at the very heart of in-
terstate tax problems. This bill stands as a tribute to Congress, and it is
only fitting to conclude this discussion with an evaluation of the bill by
Representative Willis, the man most responsible for its progress thus far:
All of our bills do not always hit exactly on the target. We are successful
sometimes, and sometimes we are not. I am reminded . . . of the story they
tell about Sir James Barry, the famous author of 'Peter Pan.' He was asked
once whether his plays were always successful, and he said, 'Some of my
plays are successful, and some are not,' and he said, 'some of my plays peter
out, and some of them pan out.' So. . . I want to say that this bill, in general,
as far as the answer to the vexatious problems of the taxpayers are concerned,
mostly will pan out, and not peter out."
APPENDIX
H.R. 2158
TITLE I-JURISDICTION To TAX
Sec. 101. Uniform Jurisdictional Standard.
No State or political subdivision thereof shall have power-
(1) to impose a net income tax or capital stock tax on a corporation other
than an excluded corporation unless the corporation has a business location in
the State during the taxable year;
(2) to require a person to collect a sales or use tax with respect to a sale
of tangible personal property unless the person has a business location in the
State or regularly makes household deliveries in the State; or
(3) to impose a gross receipts tax with respect to a sale of tangible personal




A State or political subdivision shall have power to impose a corporate net income
tax or capital stock tax, or a gross receipts tax with respect to a sale of tangible
personal property, or to require seller collection of a sales or use tax with respect
to a sale of tangible personal property, if it is not denied power to do so under
the preceding sentence.
TITLE II-MAXIMUM PERCENTAGE OF INCOME OR CAPITAL ATTRIBUTABLE TO
TAXING JURISDICTION
Sec. 201. Optional Two-Factor Formula.
A State or a political subdivision thereof may not impose on a corporation with a
business location in more than one State, other than an excluded corporation, a
net income tax (or capital stock tax) measured by an amount of net income
(or capital) in excess of the amount determined by multiplying the corporation's
base by an apportionment fraction which is the average of the corporation's
property factor and the corporation's payroll factor for the State for the taxable
year. For this purpose the base to which the apportionment fraction is applied
shall be the corporation's entire taxable income as determined under State law for
that taxable year (or its entire capital as determined under State law for the
valuation date at or after the close of that taxable year).
Sec. 202. Property Factor.
(a) In General.-A corporation's property factor for any State is a fraction,
the numerator of which is the average value of the corporation's property located
in that State and the denominator of which is the average value of all of the
corporation's property located in any State.
(b) Property Included.-The corporation's property factor shall include all
the real and tangible personal property which is owned by or leased to the
corporation during the taxable year, except-
(1) property which has been permanently retired from use, and
(2) tangible personal property rented out by the corporation to another
person for a term of one year or more.
(c) Exclusion of Personalty from Denominator.-The denominator of the
corporation's property factor for all States and political subdivisions shall not
include the value of any property located in a State in which the corporation has
no business location.
(d) Standards for Valuing Property in Property Factor.-
(1) Owned property.-Property owned by the corporation shall be valued
at its original cost.
(2) Leased property.-Property leased to the corporation shall be valued at
eight times the gross rents payable by the corporation during the taxable year
without any deduction for amounts received by the corporation from subrentals.
(e) Averaging of Property Values.-The average value of the corporation's
property shall be determined by averaging values at the beginning and ending of
the taxable year; except that values shall be averaged on a semi-annual, quarterly,
or monthly basis if reasonably required to reflect properly the location of the
corporation's property during the taxable year.
Sec. 203. Payroll Factor.
(a) In General.-A corporation's payroll factor for any State is a fraction,
the numerator of which is the amount of wages paid by the corporation to
employees located in that State and the denominator of which is the total amount
of wages paid by the corporation to all employees located in any State.
(b) Payroll Included.-The corporation's payroll factor shall include all
wages paid by the corporation during the taxable year to its employees, except
that there shall be excluded from the factor any amount of wages paid to a
retired employee.
(c) Employees Not Located in Any State.-If an employee is not located in
any State, the wages paid to that employee shall not be included in either the
[ Vol. 2 2
COMMENTS
numerator or the denominator of the corporation's payroll factor for any State
or political subdivision.
(d) Definition of Wages.-The term "wages" means wages as defined for
purposes of Federal income tax withholding in section 3401 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, but without regard to paragraph (2) thereof.
Sec. 204. Zero Denominators.
If the denominator of either the property factor or the payroll factor is zero,
then the other factor shall be used as the apportionment fraction for each State
and political subdivision. If the denominators of both the property factor and
the payroll factor are zero, then the apportionment fraction for the State where
the corporation has its business location shall be 100 percent.
Sec. 205. Capital Account Taxes on Domestic Corporations.
The State in which a corporation is incorporated may impose a capital account
tax on that corporation without division of capital, notwithstanding the juris-
dictional standard and limitation on attribution otherwise imposed by this Act.
Sec. 206. Local Taxes.
The maximum percentage of net income (or capital) of a corporation attrib-
utable to a political subdivision for tax purposes shall be determined under this
title in the same manner as though the political subdivision were a State; except
that the denominators of the corporation's property factor and payroll factor
shall be the denominators applicable to all States and political subdivisions. For
this purpose the numerators of the corporation's property factor and payroll
factor shall be determined by treating every reference to location in a State,
except the references in sections 202 (c) and 203 (c), as a reference to location
in the political subdivision.
TITLE III-SALES AND USE TAXES
Sec. 301. Reduction of Multiple Taxation.
(a) Location of Sales.-A State or political subdivision thereof may impose a
sales tax or require a seller to collect a sales or use tax with respect to an interstate
sale of tangible personal property only if the destination of the sale is-
(1) in that State, or
(2) in a State or political subdivision for which the tax is required to be
collected.
(b) Imposition of Use Tax.-A State or political subdivision thereof may not
impose a use tax with respect to tangible personal property of a person without
a business location in the State or an individual without a dwelling place in the
State; but nothing in this subsection shall affect the power of a State or political
subdivision to impose a use tax if the destination of the sale is in the State and
the seller has a business location in the State or regularly makes household
deliveries in the State.
(c) Credit for Prior Taxes.-The amount of any use tax imposed with respect
to tangible personal property shall be reduced by the amount of any sales or use
tax previously paid by the taxpayer with respect to the property on account of
liability to another State or political subdivision thereof.
(d) Refund.-A person who pays a use tax imposed with respect to tangible
personal property shall be entitled to a refund from the State or political sub-
division thereof imposing the tax, up to the amount of the tax so paid, for any
sales or use tax subsequently paid to the seller with respect to the property on
account of liability to another State or political subdivision thereof.
(e) Motor Vehicles and Motor Fuels.-
(1) Vehicles.-Nothing in subsection (a) or (b) shall affect the power of a
State or political subdivision thereof to impose or require the collection of a
sales or use tax with respect to motor vehicles that are registered in the State.
(2) Fuels.-Nothing in this section shall affect the power of a State or polit-
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ical subdivision thereof to impose or require the collection of a sales or use tax
with respect to motor fuels consumed in the State.
Sec. 302. Exemption for Household Goods, Including Motor Vehicles, in the Case
of Persons Who Establish Residence.
No State or political subdivision thereof may impose a sales tax, use tax, or
other nonrecurring tax measured by cost or value with respect to household
goods, including motor vehicles, brought into the State by a person who estab-
lishes residence in that State if the goods were acquired by that person thirty
days or more before he establishes such residence.
Sec. 303. Treatment of Freight Charges with Respect to Interstate Sales.
Where the freight charges or other charges for transporting tangible personal
property to the purchaser incidental to an interstate sale are not included in the
price but are separately stated by the seller, no State or political subdivision may
include such charges in the measure of a sales or use tax imposed with respect to
the sale or use of the property.
Sec. 304. Liability of Sellers on Sales to Business Buyers.
No seller shall be liable for the collection or payment of a sales or use tax
with respect to an interstate sale of tangible personal property if the purchaser
of such property furnishes or has furnished to the seller-
(1) a registration number or other form of identification indicating that
the purchaser is registered with the jurisdiction imposing the tax to collect
or pay a sales or use tax imposed by that jurisdiction, or
(2) a certificate or other written form of evidence indicating the basis for
exemption or the reason the seller is not required to pay or collect the tax.
No seller shall be required by a State or political subdivision thereof to classify
interstate sales for sales tax accounting purposes according to geographic areas
of the State in any manner other than to account for interstate sales with desti-
nations in political subdivisions in which the seller has a business location or
regularly makes household deliveries. Where in all geographic areas of a State
sales taxes are imposed at the same rate on the same transactions, are admin-
istered by the State, and are otherwise applied uniformly so that a seller is not
required to classify interstate sales according to geographic areas of the State in
any manner whatsoever, such sales taxes whether imposed by the State or by
political subdivisions shall be treated as State taxes for purposes of this Act.
TITLE IV-EvALUATION OF STATE PROGRESS
Sec. 401. Congressional Committees.
The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Finance of the United States Senate, acting separately or jointly,
or both, or any duly authorized subcommittees thereof, shall for four years
following the enactment of this Act evaluate the progress which the several
States and their political subdivisions are making in resolving the problems
arising from State taxation of interstate commerce and if, after four yeirs from
the enactment of this Act, the States and their political subdivisions have not
made substantial progress in resolving any such problem, shall propose such
measures as are determined to be in the national interest.
TITLE V-DEFINITIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
... . [Definitions omitted.]
Part B-Miscellaneous Provisions
Sec. 521. Permissible Franchise Taxes.
The fact that a tax to which this Act applies is imposed by a State or political
subdivision thereof in the form of a franchise, privilege, or license tax shall not
prevent the imposition of the tax on a person engaged exclusively in interstate
commerce within the State; but such a tax may be enforced against a person
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce within the State solely as a revenue
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measure and not by ouster from the State or by criminal or other penalty for
engaging in commerce within the State without permission from the State.
Sec. 522. Prohibition Against Geographical Discrimination.
(a) In General.-No provision of State law shall make any person liable for
a greater amount of sales or use tax with respect to tangible personal property,
or gross receipts tax with respect to tangible personal property, by virtue of the
location of any occurrence in a State outside the taxing State, than the amount of
the tax for which such person would otherwise be liable if such occurrence were
within the State (subject to section 523). For purposes of this subsection, the
term "occurrence" includes incorporation, qualification to do business, and the
making of a tax payment, and includes an activity of the taxpayer or of a person
(including an agency of a State or local government) receiving payments from
or making payments to the taxpayer.
(b) Computation of Tax Liability Under Discriminatory Laws.-When any
State law is in conflict with subsection (a), tax liability may be discharged in
the manner which would be provided under State law if the occurrence in ques-
tion were within the taxing State.
Sec. 523. Applicability of Act.
Nothing in section 101 or in any other provision of this Act shall be con-
sidered-
(1) to repeal Public Law 86-272 with respect to any person;
(2) to increase, decrease, or otherwise affect the power of any State or
political subdivision to impose or assess a net income or capital stock tax with
respect to an excluded corporation; or
(3) to give any State or political subdivision the power to impose a gross
receipts tax with respect to a sale of tangible personal property if the seller
would not be subject to the imposition of such a gross receipts tax without
regard to the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 524. Prohibition Against Out-of-State Audit Charges.
No charge may be imposed by a State or political subdivision thereof to cover
any part of the cost of conducting outside that State an audit for a tax to which
this Act applies, including a net income or capital stock tax imposed on an
excluded corporation.
Sec. 525. Liability With Respect to Unassessed Taxes.
(a) Periods Ending Prior to Enactment Date.-No State or political sub-
division thereof shall have the power, after the date of the enactment of this
Act, to assess against any person for any period ending on or before such date
in or for which that person became liable for the tax involved-
(1) a corporate net income tax, capital stock tax (other than a capital
account tax imposed on corporations incorporated in the State), or gross
receipts tax with respect to tangible personal property, if during such period
that person did not have a business location in the State; or
(2) a sales or use tax with respect to tangible personal property, if during
such period that person was not registered in the State for the purpose of
collecting tax, had no business location in the State, and did not regularly make
household deliveries in the State.
(b) Certain Prior Assessments and Collections.-The provisions of subsection
(a) shall not be construed-
(1) to invalidate the collection of a tax prior to the time assessment became
barred under subsection (a), or
(2) to prohibit the collection of a tax at or after the time assessment became
barred under subsection (a), if the tax was assessed prior to such time.
Sec. 526. Effective Dates.
(a) Corporate Net Income Taxes and Capital Stock Taxes.-Title II of this
Act, and the provisions of section 101 and this title (except section 525) insofar
as they relate to corporate net income taxes or capital stock taxes, shall apply in
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the case of corporate net income taxes only with respect to taxable years ending
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and in the case of capital stock taxes
only with respect to taxes for which the valuation date is later than the close of
the first taxable year ending after the date of the enactment of this Act. Any
corporation shall be permitted to adjust its reporting period for net income tax
purposes to the extent necessary to comply with this Act, effective for the first
taxable year to which title II applies.
(b) Other Provisions.-The remaining provisions of this Act shall take effect
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE VI-TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS
Sec. 601.
(a) No State or political subdivision thereof shall have the power to impose
for any taxable year ending after the date of the enactment of this Act an income
tax on the income or to establish the rate of taxation on the income of any
individual-
(1) which was earned or derived during any period while the individual
was not domiciled in the State except to the extent the income was earned
from sources within the State, or
(2) which was earned or derived from sources without the State during any
period while the individual was domiciled in the State except to the extent the
tax exceeds any income tax paid on such income to the State (or political
subdivision) in which the income was earned or derived.
(b) For purposes of this Act-
(I) the term "State" shall include the District of Columbia, and
(2) "earned" means to acquire by labor, service, or performance and does
not include the mere receipt of interest or dividend payments which are merely
a return upon an investment and are not paid as a result of labor, service, or
performance rendered.
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